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AN PAINTER

The Future of Environmental
Dispute Resolution
INTRODUCTION
Alternative dispute resolution or environmental conflict has achieved
a respectable ratio of successful settlements in the ten-plus years that it
has been a formal alternative to litigation, arbitration, and other traditional
methods of resolving environmental disputes. In a recent survey' of 160
mediated disputes, Bingham found that 133 disputants specifically stated
that their objective was to reach an agreement; of these, 78 percent of
the disputants were successful in reaching agreement. Environmental
dispute resolution (EDR) has resolved conflicts over land use and development, siting of energy facilities, resource management, utility rate
allocation, water resources, agency rulemaking, hazardous materials, air
quality, and the use of public lands. Some form of environmental dispute
resolution has been useful within jurisdictions, between jurisdictions, and
between sovereignties. Permanent institutionalization of EDR is proceeding among municipalities, many state governments, federal agencies,
and UNESCO. Conflict management, including environmental dispute
resolution, appears in many university and college curricula2 whether in
planning programs, natural resources programs, architecture programs,
biology, anthropology, psychology, business schools, guidance or sociology departments. And there is a growing and impressive body of literature devoted to environmental dispute resolution.'
This record of achievement leads practitioners to expect ever greater
success from environmental dispute resolution. More disputes, more complex disputes, more disputes peripheral to environmental issues, more
practitioners, more users, greater and more diverse funding-all have
been on the shopping list of expectations. 4
These expectations will add up to false hopes unless the methods of
environmental dispute resolution can be grounded on a rigorous and
dynamic base, one that integrates a sophisticated appreciation and underI. G.

BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE

(1986).

2. P. BIDOL, L. OLSON, T. HOWE, F ZINN & G. DAVIS, PLANNING AND DIsprE RESOLUTION AT
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, SCHOOL OF NATURAL RESOURCES, UNIV. OF MICH. (1985).

3. L. MacDonnell, An Overview of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 28 NAT. REs. J. (1988).
4. L. Susskind, The Future ofEnvironmental Dispute Resolution, paper presented at 2nd Annual
Conference on Environmental Dispute Resolution, Washington, DC (1985).
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standing of the environment with a contemporary and innovative approach
to resolving dispute. The old science and the old negotiation strategies
will not serve the new field of environmental dispute well. The field
requires an integrated conceptual base that is as flexible as the environmental and as un-mechanical as human dialogue.
The failure of environmental dispute resolution can be seen when these
old methodologies do not come to grips with the total conflict. Unresolved
issues remain to haunt the disputants much in the way that the spectre
of an appeals reversal has haunted precedent-setting environmental decisions of the '70s.
In this article the specific nature of environmental conflict will be
examined from the perspective of what is really there in the environmentan ecodynamic perspective-and what we understand to be there, and
from the perspective of information theory. Second, the article looks at
how conflicts are resolved, particularly at what elements of environmental
conflict are not resolvable and why. In the last section of this article three
questions are asked. Can mechanical solutions resolve relativistic problems? Should values be negotiated? Can environmental conflict be resolved
by negotiation?
THE NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS
Quite often the physical issues of a dispute are in the hands of those
expert in environmental science, biology, chemistry--4he technical experts.
Lawyers, disputants, and mediators are often at a loss to understand the
scientific issues in dispute. Conversely, technical experts are not expected
to be the primary negotiators in a mediated dispute; questions of equity,
parity, implementability and good faith are left to the primary representatives of the stakeholders in the dispute. In complex environmental disputes these technical experts need to know not just their engineering; the
nature of the environment demands a sophisticated and integrated understanding of natural processes. Two problems are before both the experts
and negotiators: first, they must authentically realize the dynamic indeterminabilities of "environment"; second, they must confront that interpretation and understanding both as it influences the authenticity of their
sense-data and as it influences the perceptions that must be shared among
all parties at the negotiating table. Here are two very serious sources of
error in environmental dispute resolution. What is actually happening in
the environment and how are the sense-data to be recorded? How have
one's perceptions of that reality altered the reality itself?. How are one's
perceptions different from another's? Is there more than one "real world"
at the negotiation table?
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The Real World
Perhaps it seems that a metaphysical discussion of real-world science
is too philosophical for an article on environmental conflict. Since we
cannot apprehend the "real" world (it may be illusory in any case), why
not just deal with the facts and get on with it? Because the facts are
deceptive. Without some notion of the processes that motivate facts and
sense-data, the data themselves are without meaning. There are four very
characteristic and typical attributes of environmental processes which
should be in mind when these sense-data are taken. These attributes
describe the context, even provide the context, of the real world: ecosystems are complex, dissipative, nonreversible, and logarithmic/analogous. /
These four attributes belong to the relational phenomena, phenomena
that are a level more complex than elemental, discrete phenomena. Elemental phenomena are such things as acre-feet of water, carrying capacity
of an arid steppe, the entire biological population of an estuary. Relational
phenomena are the basic interaction between elements in an environment:
reproductive strategy of one species vis-a-vis another's; competition and
cooperation within and between species; evolutionary pressure; the patterns of cultural use of an environment in which that culture is no longer
present; information exchange between species; participation between
lithosphere and atmosphere systems. 5
Complexity is a measure of the entropy and information levels of an
environmental system. Relational phenomena all by themselves are complex. Even elemental phenomena, such as a stream, have a certain quantity
of information, a certain level of information about them: volume and
periodicity of flow, quality of water (turbidity, dissolved oxygen, organic
matter, trade metals), direction and path of flow. These data assume
significance when they are related to other information: what is the source
of the stream, where does the stream empty, what kind of habitat does
the stream support, of which ecosystems is it a part? And this information
becomes significant when all streams or participatory bodies of water, all
related habitats and influenced animal and plant populations both macroscopic and microscopic, are together and at once considered. It is as
if one progressed from writing simple sentences to compound sentences
to compound-complex. The simple and compound sentences are closely
5. For a sense of the more complex workings of natural systems see L. VON BERTALANFFY,
GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY (rev. 1968 ed.), K. BOULDING, ECODYNAMICS (1978), E. JANTSCH, THE
SELF-ORGANIZING UNIVERSE (1980), and 1. PRIGOGINE & 1. STENGERS, ORDER Our OF CHAOS (1984).
Each of these books is accessible and deals with biological systems in a context of the real world,
society, and human systems evolution.
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related--one is arithmetically longer than the other. But the compoundcomplex sentence is qualitatively different. It is in this sense that environments are complex.
Further, complexity is an attribute of specific organisms. Each species
or rock contains an evolutionary history that consists of both information
and a certain order in which that information appears. Blood proteins
present hundreds of thousands of years of evolutionary passage; mineral
content in rock depicts a history of land formation and transformation
millions of years in length. Human bodies contain the evolutionary trails
and traces of thousands of non-human ancestors. The more information
which is encoded in the organism (or the metabolic processes by which
the organism makes a living) the more ordered the organism is considered
to be: order and information level are directly related.
A complex environment has a high degree of information and it is
organized at a high level. Over time, intuition tells us, biological processes
should decay and become less ordered, losing their energy. This does not
happen. What does happen in living systems is a dissipative shift from
one degree of order to a higher degree of order. The system reorganizes
in the presence of fluctuation and waste heat. 6 On a molecular level the
system becomes more ordered; at the organismic level (the whole animal)
random changes are less favored than changes which conserve information. And so it goes: in populations (many animals) the change is
toward structural stability with the freedom to devolve retained. 7 In human
populations urbanization can be modelled, for example, by looking at
the shift toward increased order that comes about through dissipating
energy. The increased order-in this case a city-goes against our predictions of decay through increasingly chaotic and disorganized village
economic and cultural interactions. The order is "counterintuitive."8
Typically a system interacts or communicates with its surroundings
and it metamorphoses from one (less) ordered state to another, more,
ordered state. The new state is more highly structured, possesses a degree
more information, and it cannot go backward in time to what it was
earlier. This is the attribute of irreversibility.Time is not irrelevant to the
real world. The real world exists in a time that has a single direction
because natural processes cannot be reversed. Even while tending to
become more ordered, an ecoystem will lose the flexibility that permits
a symmetrical return to equilibrium states.9 Chemical systems might evolve
and devolve in near hysteria, but biological systems do not have that
6. 1. PRIGOGINE & I.
7. Id. at 12.
8. Id. at 206.
9. Id. at 203.

STENGERS,

supra note 5, at 5.
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degree of freedom, having sacrificed it for a higher information content.
What this means is that environment has a distinct time and place; it is
here and now, when and how the data were gathered that are being used
at the negotiation table. The data were different (probably) before now
and they will be different after now. And while relativity physics is
independent of time (multiple realities are not just possible, they are
probable), biology is not. An arroyo in the Southwest is not just a twosided cliff. It is the place where water used to be yesterday and where it
will be tomorrow but, to paraphrase Lewis Carroll, where it cannot be
found today.'o Environment is consistent in time, not relative. Is this timeconsistency always clear in the methodology of environmental factfindings?
The fourth attribute of the real world is its analogue character. Environmental processes are characteristically analogous and not discrete, let
alone binary. A forest isn't totally infested or totally free of pine beetle;
it is somewhat infested and somewhat pest-free. When it is pronounced
"infested" that judgement seems abrupt. All along, and not obviously
measurably (larvae aren't found, bark appears healthy, infected logs aren't
placed near clean areas of the forest, windborne agents aren't evident),
some change has been taking place. Then, all of a sudden, the forest is
"infested." This is an example of a phase change. The pronouncement
is simply the confirming evidence of analogue change that has been
proceeding gradually. So, while science measures the traces of "on/off"
phenomena, "either/or" and "if/and only if" happenings and events, it
is the gradual process of "and/or," "maybe," and "sometimes" that
accurately characterizes the natural world. By the time something is
measurably there the process of its becoming has ended. Indeed, the
something may be gone by the time we measure its presence-let alone
be altered by our very act of measurement."
Environmental processes are also characteristically logarithmicand not
additively cumulative. If a stream experiences contamination through
agriculture-initiated sedimentary pollution, then a second stream will also
be contaminated. At this point the data-gatherer looks not for the next
stream affected, but the next two affected, then the next twelve. By the
same rule a single system will affect not just one other system but several.
If there are gross changes in the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere there will be gross changes in the water budget (in the oceans, in
(ed. 1946).
11. A sense of the current understanding of the theories of quantum physics, of which the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is a critical part, is found in G. ZUKAV, THE DANCING Wu LI
MAsmsS (1979), and also in F. CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT (1982) and 1. PRIGoGNE & I. STENGERS,
supra note 5.
10. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
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the quality and quantity of both ocean and non-oceanic water), in the
reflective and absorptive qualities of the atmosphere (and therefore in the
amount of light striking the earth and the temperature of the planet), in
the biomass (vegetation and fauna are both influenced critically as to type
and quantity by temperature and moisture). 2
Logarithmic and analogic properties of the environmental processes
are also characteristically uncertain. The moment at which a shift from
the cumulative and arithmetic mode of elemental phenomena to the analogue and logarithmic mode of relational phenomena is sudden. And when
that shift occurs is uncertain. Although there is a high probability that
the dissipative structures (that is to say the self-organizing structures which
Prigogine has described) will shift the situation to a new phase that is
more ordered and that represents a certain stability won from a chaotic
and decaying environment, we cannot know with certainty at what stage
in the environmental process such a shift will take place.
To summarize, the environment, which consists of both elemental and
relational phenomena, is complex in its level of information (or negative
entropy), dissipative by way of using waste heat energy to re-organize
to a higher and richer order, irreversible because it is firmly situated in
a time continuum that possesses a direction that is always obvious, and
analogical/logarithmicin the way in which its processes unfold. How
we humans perceive such an environment brings to bear the whole notion
of perception and cognition. If the real world is as it is (as we have just
characterized it), why do we each perceive it differently from one another?
Does our perception alter the reality of the environment?
Perceiving the Real World
The very manner in which we apprehend the reality of our world can
determine that reality.' 3 For a true understanding of environmental conflict
there must be a true understanding of the environment, both how it
functions and how we perceive its functioning. All environmental disputes
at some level hinge on the interpretation of data.
The very phrase-perceiving the real world-implies an object and an
observer, one apart from the other. The observer participates in the life
of the object through the act of observing the object. The dialectic of
12. J. LOVELOCK, GAIA, A NEW LOOK AT LiVE ON EARTH, 64-106 (1979).

13. Innate structures of language, which are attributed to concepts proposed by Chomsky (see
N. CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE, 1975, for a review of his concepts), have been enthusiastically taken up by linguistics, anthropologists, cognitive philosophers, and psychologists. There
is still a lot of controversy about whether there might even be innate structures, let alone where they
might reside. But innate structures of consciousness are even more controversial: see J. Shear,
Maharishi, Plato and the TM-Sidhu Program on Innate Structures of Consciousness, 12 METAPtILOSOPHY
(Jan. 1981) for a review and discussion of Chomsky and Jung.
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apartness and participation is the first operation we should examine in
order to inform ourselves about the workings of the natural world and
our perception of same. It is the distance between observer and object,
the apartness, that is a cause of environmental conflict. And it is the
participation by the observer in the life of the object that is a cause of
environmental conflict. When alienation and identification come together
at the negotiating table they cause conflict.
Participation and apartness are a metaphor of life. The metaphor is
first and most simply apparent in cellular life. Millions of years ago, at
the time of the evolution of cells from complex molecular compounds
and amino acids, the smallest unit of life was a primitive cell, lacking
nucleus and cell organelles, that resembled a virus. It was invaded (more
than once, perhaps) by other primitive organisms with which it then lived
symbiotically. The result of the symbiosis is an evolved cell which possesses cell membrane, nucleus, and organelles (chloroplast if plant, mitochondrion if animal). The cogent point of this thesis, which Margulis and
her co-worker are terming the endosymbiosis hypothesis, 4 is that the
difference between the simple cell and the evolved cell is a qualitative
difference: the evolved cell (eukaryote) can photosynthesize and respire;
it has pigment and is light-sensitive; it has a flagellar apparatus and can
move about.
At the more complex level of human society the metaphor is again
present, again, through a hypothesis (this one advanced by an anthropologist). Symbiosis, or participation, is seen in so-called primitive societies, according to Ivy-Bruhl, when a tribesman can be said to have a
sense not of individuality or separate consciousness, but of participation
in the collective life of the tribe. lvy-Bruhl calls this the participation
mystique.
The consciousness which "primitive man" has of his individuality,
we were saying, is enveloped in a complex where the predominant
element is the feeling that the individual has of "belonging" to a
group which has the true individuality and of which he is simply an
element, like the other members, in the true sense of the word, of
the social body. 5
The point to be made here is the persistence of the metaphor of apartness
and participation-while not describing all states of consciousness-it
14. Painter, The Evolution of Planetary Consciousness, PROC. OF A CONFERENCE, GAIA, at
Amherst, Mass. (1985) for a review of Margulis' hypothesis, participation, and a synthesis of the
dialectic.
15. See L. LtgVY-BRUHL, NOTEBOOKS ON PRIMITIVE MENTALITY (1975). See also Painter, The
Evolution of Planetary Consciousness, supra note 14.
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does explain the type of thinking that is typically brought to the mediation
process.
The dualism is with us today in western thought. Participation at the
early beginnings of this culture was seen in the immanence of divinity
in everything. As there was no separation between individual and his
surrounding, all were one and divine. Everything was imbued with magic.
It is at this point, suggests Langer, that science began: consciousness
exists apart from nature and in that fashion things can be known; if they
are magical they cannot be known, much less understood. Apartness
permitted Greeks (and scientists) to suppose that what is seen or felt is
real and not, as Parmenides and earlier, mystical Greeks had held, illusory.
And apartness has not just permitted science and rationalism; it encourages
alienation and fear of the abyss and what isn't one's consciousness. 6
The dualism of immanence and transcendance persists in the most
enlightened venues of discussion about environmental disputes. Immanence, or an informing divinity, is present in everything. Or if we reject
that notion, then we say that we transcend the earthly coil of our natures
and participate in the divinity that is outside of us, above us. This is
Tribe's analysis. 7 What seems to have happened is a continuation of the
metaphor. If one is apart and separate from nature (one's consciousness
is not the same as that rock, for example, and one may go to Heaven
but the rock isn't going to make it), the real world is broken into two
pieces-self and other. It follows that the motivating urge in western
philosphy has been to transcend the separation and to embrace Other.
This is what has in fact occurred: where the tradition of separation has
existed there is now an effort to rehabilitate Other to embrace its alienness. Nowhere is this more apparent than in western attitudes toward
wilderness. " If Other cannot be consumed by being mastered, then it can
be consumed by love. Also, the romantic notions of anti-anthropocentrism, another mainstream in environmental problem-solving, are hotbeds
of traditionalist ambivalence: the rights of trees, the thoughts of mountains
and so forth. 9
16. S.LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY (1956 3rd ed.) at 273. See also 1. PRIGOGINE & 1.
STENGERS, supra note 5, at 3, for this quotation from Francois Monod, the biologist: "Man must
at last finally awake from his millenary dream; and in doing so, awake to his total solitude, his
fundamental isolation. Now does he at last realize that, like a gypsy, he lives on the boundary of
an alien world."
17. Tribe, Ways not to Think about Plastic Trees: New Foundationsfor Environmental Law, 83
YALE LAW J. 1315 (1974).
18. R. NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (rev. 1967 ed.) and J. SAX, MOUNTAINS
WrroTr HANDRAILS (1980).
19. See Tribe, supra note 17. See also Frankel, The Rights of Nature, WHEN VALUES CONFLICT,
at 93-113 (1976). Aldo Leopold is said to have recommended that humans learn to think like a
mountain, a notion that
isquaint and impossible: see Skolimowski, The Dogma of Anti-Anthropo-
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For the societies other than the dominant western culture, the dualism
of transcendence and immanence has never been a part of the vocabulary.
Literally. The choice between belief in transcendence and immanence
may not be an exercise of free will but rather a function of one's cognitive
practice and indeed, the perceptual apparatus itself. Language shapes, by
itself, the perception of the "real world." And language for the Hopi,
for example, is very different from English. The famous example from
Whorf, which is perhaps too simplistic, but has led to a productive line
of investigation since the mid-thirties to the present, suggests that verb
and noun, with the verb tense indeterminate, are present in the word: it
is the quality of the "light," in the example, that it "flashes." "The light
flashes" is a one-word phrase, in Hopi. When the event occurred is not
a necessary part of the communication. 2 The question to be asked is,
where is language formed? Are there innate structures of languages? Do
they reside within the brain or the mind, like templates, somewhat restricting the types of speech which humans have, while at the same time
allowing a certain freedom in their perceptions of the "real world"?
Sparrows, it seems, do have speech templates that prohibit their singing
finch, but that permit them to sing bad sparrow. 2' Another question to be
asked is what is the relevance of language to culture? Everything, according to a life's work by Lvi-Strauss. If there are three shape-adjectives
in the society's language, then everything the members see is either round,
or reed-shaped, or tortilla-shaped. While the dominant culture persists in
its dualisms, the other participants at the environmental dispute resolution
sessions may have an entirely different linguistic context, perceptual context, and cognitive process.
If the environmental conflict is cross-cultural, especially, then the disputants must have some sense of the different meanings language has,
and of the different uses to which it can be put. Humans name their
environment in order to know it. We create signs; we use signs. And we
use signs as symbols, transforming them in that way to a higher level of
utility. We use these symbols in order to know the real world. By naming
centrism and Ecophilosophy, 6 ENV. ETHics 283. For a definition and defense of ecophilosophy, see
Watson, Eco-Ethics, WHOLE EARTH REVIEW (Mar. 1985). The entire (partisan) controversy of consciousness--who has it, what responsibilities does it entail--and the entire discussion of the extent
to which earnest practitioners anthropomorphize their environment are rich veins for the dispute
resolver to mine, Contributions to these discussions range from esoteric and obscure to the readable
and oversimplified.
20. See B. WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY (1956) for a presentation of the concepts
behind what has come to be known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Currently the classic interpretation
of Whorf's work is in some disrepute, so belief in the word should be tempered with skepticism.
21. The experiments with deafened sparrows were presented in a seminar by Porter, at Duke
University, in 1972. Porter used the word "template," which I have appropriated to the world of
conflict resolution.
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we proceed to knowing. If one party in a dispute is naming something,
then he is using language as a sign. If another party uses this name, it
may become a symbol, thus, acquiring a new level of utility (not to
mention meaning and significance). Symbol manipulation is the operation
by which we perceive the real world, whether mathematical, artistic, or
linguistic. Symbols are to signs what compound-complex sentences are
to simple sentences and what relational phenomena are to elemental phenomena-a higher, more complex and more ordered level of information
and organization. If sign-making is a kind of naming by assigning meaning
to sense-data, then symbol manipulation is an act of transformation. What
is really happening when, in a ritual-like act, an environmentalist chains
himself to a tree, when someone wears a bearclaw necklace, when bamboo
stalks are painted on paper? These are symbolic acts of participation by
human beings. Environmental systems themselves, in their interactions,
manipulate
symbols and may give operative significance to the planet's
22
life.
What do facts and sense-data tell us about the meaning of symbols
that we unconsciously use every moment of the day? Will facts explain
the sacredness of a view of four mountains? Information theory suggest
that an interesting event occurs when we know a lot of facts-many of
the small bits of information that clutter the landscape: the more data we
have about the minute scale of reality, the less we know about the large
scale of reality. Facts and sense-data inform us about the minute energy
state and the specificness of what a particular bit of matter is doing at a
specific moment-the Eigenstate. But the more we can be certain of the
Eigenstate, the less certain we can be of the outcome of a given reaction
or event. We can know probability, but we cannot know certainties. This
is a thermodynamic way of saying the whole environment is greater than,
and different from, the sum of the known information that defines that
environment. This is a very cogent argument for giving fact-finding a
new definition in environmental dispute resolution.
A final notion to explore in our perception of the real world is the
notion of recursiveness, or identity. Machines are comfortable with yes/
no situations and very uncomfortable with maybe, with feedback loops,
and with logical impossibilities. Humans are able to recognize simultaneity and paradox but a computer, for example, only recognizes oblig-

22. See J. PowE.L, THE TAO OF SYMBOLS (1982) and S. LANGER, supra note 16, and N. CHOMSKY,
supra note 13, for symbol manipulation. See also Painter, supra note 14, for symbolic operations
and consciousness; HOFSTADTER, GOEDEL, ESCHER, BACH: THE ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (1979) for
mathematical symbolics and word-play; WrTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND THE BROWN NOTEmOKS and
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTGAT1ONS (1953) for the quintessence of language, symbols, and operations.
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atory bifurcations. Norbert Weiner23 explains that a computer, given the
information that Epimenides, a Cretan, says "All Cretans are liars," asked
if what Epimenides is saying is the truth, endlessly prints out "yes...
no. . .yes. . no. . . ."It is the nature of the real world to be nonlinear
and it is within our understanding to appreciate illogic and paradox. Can
our institutions, such as our legal system, our political systems, and our
science, deal with illogic and recursiveness of the real world? Can environmental mediation comprehend illocution and paradox?
THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT
Paradoxes, humor and illocutions are all formed from the juxtaposition
of two types of information--one type that has a certain amount of
information, and another type that has some of the first type and some
new information. The Epimenides paradox is a class of information within
another class of information. That same kind of embeddedness occurs
when a message is framed by a context, or as Whorf put it, in metacommunication. Frame, context, and information are all of different logical
types. Gregory Bateson presents the following discussion of logical typing, a line of reasoning that will illuminate and clarify the "how" of
environmental conflict-and the "why".
The zebra may identify (for the lion) the nature of the context in
which they meet by bolting, and even the well-fed lion may give
chase. But the hungry lion needs no such labeling of that particular
context. He learned long ago that zebras can be eaten. Or was this
lesson so early as to require no teaching? Were parts of the necessary
knowledge innate?'
(This last question was considered a little earlier, in the section on language.) It is the zebra's action that communicates to the lion, who,
operating at a higher logical type, interprets the message as dinner, or
nuisance. Bateson defines the "hierarchy" of logical types in this way:
"the step from one logical type to the next higher is a step from information about an event to information about a class of events or from
23. See G. BATESON, MIND AND NECESSITY (1979), at 130 [hereinafter G. BATESON]. The story
of the computer and the Epimenides paradox is also told in HOFSTADTER, supra note 22. Recursiveness
is a notion explored at length by Hofstadter; illocution is discussed by N. CHOMSKY, supra note 13.
Bifurcations, or breaks in the symmetry of logic, are discussed in WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 22:
breaks in the symmetry of time are defined in E. JANTSCH, supra note 15. Computers and the limits
to their reasoning powers are discussed in HoisTrADTu & DUrToN, THE MIND's EYE (1984); WEZE.NBAUM,
COMPUrER POWER AND HUMAN REASON (1976).

24. G. BATESON, supra note 23, at 128.
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considering the class to considering the class of classes." 25 It is possible
that a class of classes will contain different logical types-a variegated
class: this can provide humor, or it can provide paradox. And, it can
discommunicate. 6 A logical type appropriate to a certain classification
may be misapplied to another classification. Effect and cause may be
reversed, for example. Korzybski's dictum, the map is not the territory,
demonstrates, according to Bateson, a coding or transformation that takes
place between logical types; the processes of transformation are hierachically organized, he maintains. It is the qualitative difference, not the
quantitative ones, that is caused by a transformation in the amount and
kind of information which is being communicated which logical types
have to offer us. In view of the previous discussion of the non-information
being offered by a quantity of facts, logical type is a particularly useful
notion for the practitioner resolving environmental disputes.

How is logical type then misapplied? When a tree is used as a definition
of a forest, an inconsistency of logic is committed; applying that incon-

sistency, as if one had it in hand, to include the class of everything meant
by the notion of forest, perpetrates an error of communication-an error
of symbols. In Indian water rights conflicts, irrigable acreage (a logical

type that derives from a definition of 'water' in the West) is applied to a
context of alfalfa farming and in-stream use. It simply doesn't fit: the
notion of water permits either in-stream use (free-flowing, non-con25. Id. at 137. Bateson goes farther, as do 1, pursuing the consequences of this train of thought;
in G. BATESON & M. C. BATESON, ANGELS FEAR (1987), he reviews his earlier work and summarizes
one of the six thesis in MIND AND NECESSrrY: "the description and classification of these [mental]
processes of transformation disclose a hierarchy of logical types immanent in the phenomena," supra
note 23, at 19. "The world of mental process opens into a self-organizing world of Chinese boxes
in which information generates further information," supra note 23, at 19, and "the rules for drawing
maps are immanent in the nature of that which is being represented in the map," id. at 21. makes
it clear that Bateson distinguished between information possessed by logical types and information
organized by logical typing. Bateson uses the terms pleroma to describe the physical world, and
creatura to describe the realities that organize (live in, make use of, are of a more subsuming logical
type than) the things in themselves. "Insofar as living things contain communication, insofar as they
are, as we say, organized, they must contain something of the nature of message, events that travel
within the living thing or between one living thing and others. And in the world of communication,
there must necessarily be categories and classes and similar devices. But these devices do not
correspond to the physical causes by which the materialist accounts for events. There are no messages
or classes in the prebiological universe." Id. at 62. What I call determinacy and they call pleroma
is not and cannot contain rules of its own understanding; what they call creatura does contain
immanent maps, and is self-organizing. It is interesting to contrast Prigogine's conclusion of the
material world's ruthless self-organization through dissipative structures. At any event, one is also
careful to avoid a quality of pleroma and creatura, which M. C. Bateson notes, and to point to an
experience that is neither "supernatural nor mechanical," id. at 30. We can make a map from a
territory; we see that a dissipative structure is a type of higher logical forcefulness that the equilibrium
state preceding it; but the name of the thing is not the thing itself, no matter what paradigm we use
to obfuscate that truth.
26. See H. MoRowrrz, EN'TRopy FOR BioLoGisTs (1970) on information theory and the inevitability
of mis- and dis-communication.
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sumption) or alfalfa farming (diverted and consumptive). But irrigable
acreage is the sacrosanct yardstick of Indian water rights measure and it
is deemed consumptive. Is water also an export market? A synfuel oper-

ation? A slurry pipeline? A sacrament? In case studies below, water is
indeed logically typed so as to contain all these possibilities.
In a water conflict, the settlement, in this case the apportioning of a
smallish aquifer, must be logically consistent (as to level of logical type)
with the notions and meaning and contexts of recharge, discharge, infiltration, leaching and evaporation. And the settlement must be consistent
in time as well: for how long will the aquifer be apportioned? Historically
and prehistorically what has been the use pattern of the aquifer? To use
another example, take the notion or "crime":
We act as if crime could be extinguished by punishing parts of what
we regard as criminal actions, as if "crime" were the name of a sort
of action or part of a sort of action. More correctly, "crime" . . . is
the name of a way of organizing actions. It is, therefore, unlikely
that punishing the act will extinguish the crime. In several thousand
years, the so-called science of criminology has not escaped from the
simple blunder in logical typing."'

One of the ways in which we mistake the level of logical types is
through determinancy-a lawyer sees law, the scientist sees technical
fixes, the politician frames dispute and settlement in terms of power and
who has it,2" and most everyone wonders what the cost, dollar value,
and bottom line are. Economic determinism, a particularly insidious practice of mistyping, has carried the day for the last fifteen years. The U.S.
27. G. BATEsoN, supra note 23, at 138. A cogent example of the kind of mental confusion that
results from the mind's confronting a logical inconsistency of type is seen in Burton supra note 30
in the cases of IBM and Aerojet. Neither choice to negotiate (in contradistinction to a choice to
adjudicate, or even to pursue both paths) was preceded by the eminently precedent question of
whether toxic acceptables are policy that can be put on the negotiating table-whether toxic acceptables are even policy, let alone whether such a policy fits on the table. Is agency policy negotiated?
Or is it properly set by rulemaking?. But are acceptable levels of toxic pollutants policy at all?

Typological confusion is explored with humor and a little angst in

Ho'sTAmTE,

MErAMAGICAL

(1986), supra note 23, at 85, 538. Not just an inapt nesting of levels, he warns, but a total
fusion of watcher and watched (as seen in the Goedel construction) is possible in the minds of
conscious beings. Given the possibility, or proclivity, for just such a fusion, is it any wonder that
we are what we see? The reality may be that watcher and watched are identical pace. Id., Hofstadter):
"It is not that things we see do not exist at all but rather that they do not exist as we perceive them."
J. HOPKINS, THE TANTRIC DtSTtNCTION 135 (1984).
28. It is the political determinists, for whom history is the narative of conflict-"the form of a
war rather than that of a language; relations of power, not relations of meaning," who sentimentalize
language and trivialize or de-relativize metaphysics. Power relations are clearly the root, for example
of much of Folk-Williams' analysis (see supra note 31). Even Foucault, though, whom I've quoted
here, came to rehabilitate the 'self' from the gulag to which he had exiled it in his earlier writing.
Work in progress just before he died is obsessed with consideration of 'self'. See M. FOUCAULT,
THE FOUCAuLT READER at 343, 351 (1984).
THEMAS
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Army Corps of Engineers, for example, started terming their way of
determining whether a project would get built or not (their decisionmaker)
the benefit-cost ratio, instead of the cost-benefit ratio. The attempt to
broaden the utility of a particularly narrow logical type has not exactly
met with success although it has had practitioners scurrying to assign a
monetary value to all kinds of non-economic logical types.29 For example,
Taos Pueblo has exchanged land and water rights in an effort to repatriate
their sacred Blue Lake.
But, it is the legal determinism that is truly ubiquitous. Such faith has
been vested in judicial process, that first, law is made in an effort to
resolve conflict; second, appeals in courts of law attempt to resolve conflict; third, a decision is made (again) upon a point of law---either precedent or something intrinsic to the law in the case. Three times the legal
framework is applied like a template to the conflict. Or maybe four times.
As Burton points out in his paper on toxic cleanup, an adversarial and
legalistic implementation of environmental protection policies may be
perceived to inhibit the potential for devising creative solutions to the
pollution problems, at the same time both increasing the time and expense
in making decisions and influencing the content and tone of the decision
itself (for example, EPA adopting threshold due process standards).30 The
popularity of alternative dispute resolution is testament to the template's
poor fit. One of the difficulties with the legal framework is its inability
to address the level of logical type in a way consistent with the time in
which that type is operating. In U.S. v. New Mexico3 the court determined
that the controlling factor in quantifying water use is generally the original
purpose for which the Native American reservation was put aside. At one
time in history it was reasonable to assume that irrigating potential farmland was the ultimate purpose of a reservation's acreage and its water.
But that assumption is out of date now, and may have been egregious
racism in any case. The legal principle of res judicata as well as the
"principle of finality"32 again point to a certain time horizon that is
contrary to the real world. These principles effectively preclude re-adjudicating a "resolved" case. A narrow, and deterministic worldview has
restricted the resolution of conflict, leaving in its wake "settlements" that
are inappropriate to the logical type of the conflict and that cannot with29. Socolow, Failures of Discourse: Obstacles to the Integration of Environmental Values into
Natural Resource Policy, WHEN VALUES CONFLICT 1-35 (1976). See also Sagoff, At the Shrine of

Our Lady of Fatima or Why Political Questions Are NotAll Economic,

ETHICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

(1984).
30. Burton, Negotiating the Cleanup of Toxic Groundwater Contamination: Strategy and Legitimacy, 28 NAT. RES. J. 105 (1988).
31. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
32. Folk-Williams, The Use of Negotiated Agreements to Resolve Water Disputes Involving Indian
Rights, 28 NAT. RES. J. 69 (1988) [hereinafter Folk-Williams].
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stand the test of time. All legal settlements? No. But many environmental
conflicts would be better resolved if there were a way to step back into
them from time to time, and to anticipate where the environment is going
and build this knowledge (probability, not certainty) into the settlement.
Resolving environmental conflict, or most conflicts, is essentially a
question of determining use and ownership. Use is one logical type, or
classification, and ownership is another. Sovereignty and jurisdiction are
within the classification of ownership; usufruct is within use. But the
levels of logical type are confused-much like Bateson's example of
"crime" and "punishing the act"-and conflicts purported to be over
how the resource is to exploited (usufruct) are really over questions of
ownership. And conversely, how many disputes over jurisdiction are
really disputes over the value system to be invoked to determine the
resource's exploitation?
The settlement's logical type must be appropriate to the conflict's logical type. And by that standard, the methodology to be used in resolving
the conflict must be appropriate as to its inclusiveness and flexibility with
regard to the conflict and the settlement. In traditional adversarial dispute
resolution-the kind of resolution that pits one side against the otherdiscrete problems are settled with winners and losers accepting ultimate
decisions. Alternative methods of dispute resolution intend to move beyond
discrete problems to integrative problems (a combination of both, actually),
beyond win-lose (or binary) decisions. Alternative methods encourage a
community of parties to arrive at a mutually acceptable resolution (winwin, or analogous). This kind of settlement is of an appropriate logical
type to the nature of environmental conflict. Unfortunately, by and large
EDR has not brought the traditional techniques of negotiation and mediation up to a logical type level that, in practice, fits with the desirable
definition above. Most examples of conflict resolution are rife with determinancy (marketplace, legal, even cultural) and are sadly hamstrung by
out-dated methodology. But when EDR works, it works better than anything else out there.
Arizona v. California
The long-standing suit brought by Arizona against the state of California
over the entitlement to withdrawal from the lower Colorado River was
basically resolved by litigation in 1963, about fifteen years after the suit
was brought before the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The
landmark decision first presented the notion of practicably irrigable acreage
as a means of quantifying right and ownership of water on Indian reservations. Party to the suit were a number of tribes in Arizona and California. Unresolved were the seniority of rights among Indian and nonIndian users, the precise meaning of "practicably irrigable acreage," and
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boundary changes on reservations that will result in an increase in Indian
acreage.33 When 21 tribes petitioned to re-examine the settlement in the
light of their having excluded stakeholders, the settlement was re-opened.
Distributive negotiations, long a staple for court settlement and negotiation strategy, is essentially a pie-cutting operation. The pie has had to
be cut in many more pieces than first planned, and now the pieces are
going to be much bigger than was thought. Perhaps EDR, in asking with
legitimacy and sincerity, who should be a party to this conflict, could
provide a better methodology for pie-cutting problems; as to the legitimacy of approaching an environmental dispute as if one were cutting a
pie, at least in this case it needs to be a double-layer pie.
Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission
The Commission has the authority, under state law passed in 1979,
and again in 1985, to adjudicate all state water basins and to resolve
disputes, by negotiated compact, which arise during the adjudication
process. This gives the State, essentially, disposition of Indian water
interests in accordance with a code approved by the U.S. Secretary of
the Interior.' Many more different negotiations are underway than just
those between the Commission and various Indian tribes.35 In negotiations
with the Assiniboine and Sioux tribes a simple pie-cutting issue threatened
to derail the talks: The Flathead tribe withdrew from negotiations; possible
reasons are once again the question of fully recognizing all the stakeholders. In this instance, during the negotiation sessions, the right of the
allottees (landholders granted allotments, or private property on the reservation, through descent from Indians living on the land during the time
of the General Allotment Act, and, therefore, not [necessarily] holding
land communally) to file for water rights was suspended. This possibly
resulted in the allottees' loss of the opportunity to file for water rights.
Also, it was alleged that the tribal negotiation team did not speak for the
allottees. The entire issue of allottees and enrolled tribal members is a
complex one and is discussed later in the article. The universe of legal
discourse, in this instance, had restricted rightful stakeholders from participation in a negotiated settlement and this threatened to skew negotiations that the Commission engaged in for its entire lifetime.
In another agreement between the Commission and the Northern Chey33. 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963). See J. FOLK-WILLIAMS, WHAT INDIAN WATER MEANS TO TEe WEST
(1982) 32-34 [hereinafter INDIAN WATER].
34. Folk-Williams, supra note 32; MINuTES OF THE MONTANA RESERVED WATER RIGHTS COMPAC"
COMMISSION, 1981-1983 [hereinafter MINUTES]. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-211 to 293, § 2-15-212
(1983).
35. Folk-Williams, supra note 32, at 63.
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enne, the environmental consequences of a dam on the Tongue River may
bring additional stakeholders into the dispute.' Same problem, but a
different deterministic attitude: as of this moment the environmentalists
have not been brought into the the discussions; the impact of the dam is
significant-without equity among the environmental interests neither
dispute nor environment is being served with the appropriate methodology. Another dispute,37 also being negotiated by the Commission, this
one with the Ft. Peck Tribes and involving expanded authority on the
upper Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, is not integrating environmental
concerns shared by the State and the Department of Natural Resources.
Are the Commission's compacts being made with the greatest possible
attention to the complexity of the environment (impacts of adjudication
in one watershed upon decisions in another, or lower watersheds) and to
the sensitivity of the strategies that are time-dependent (agricultural use
and exportation of the water resource)? So far the record would now say
that compact negotiations and settlements did not show any better trackrecord than traditional dispute resolution techniques. The most difficult
issue, however, is still to be confronted: Can the Commission discriminate
between the logical types of use and ownership, and will it do so more
thoroughly and more authentically than traditional forums?
Federal Coal Management Programs
The revision of federal policy3" with regard to coal leasing began before
the Arab oil embargo; the coal industry was depressed, federal holdings
were very large and the technology for safer and less polluting production
and combustion were in place. Coal leases were being sold cheaply and
speculation was charged. Sales were discontinued in 1971, resumed in
1981 with the pressure from higher oil and gas prices, and again in 1981
the lease sales ran into trouble, this time because state participation and
environmental concerns were being slighted. Lawsuits again caused suspension of sales.
Environmental concerns focus on what is considered land suitable for
coal mining activity (and sale of federal leases) and land that should be
excluded from that activity. In the Coal Management Act (Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act, 1976) lands deemed unsuitable for coal leasing
are defined. The policy that is the basis of the criteria that exclude land
from lease sale is called a "multiple use" policy. However, the language
36.

MINuFES, supra note 34.
37. Id.
38. REVIEW OF PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS IN FEDERAL COAL LEASING, U.S. DEPT. INTERIOR
(1984), and REVIEW OF THE UNSUITABILITY CRITERIA IN FEDERAL COAL LEASING, U.S. DEPT. INTERIOR
(1985) [hereinafter REVIEW].
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of the Act undermines the meaning of "exclusion." Perhaps this is one
of the illogicalities and paradoxes that machines handle poorly: an unsuitable area may become more suitable if it can be multiply used. In other
words, a wilderness area, such as the Bisti Badlands in New Mexico,
has one classificatory use-it is a wilderness. But for some reason that
logical type, "wilderness" is either lower on the hierarchy (in Bateson's
sense) or laterally aligned on the hierarchy in such a way that the logical
type "suitable for coal use under the multiple use goal of the management
act" has a higher position. So the Bisti Badlands, a wilderness, can be
leased for right-of-way for a coal field railroad and slurry line. The Act
reads "Industry will also be asked to explain why coal production in a
particular area would be important enough to reduce or eliminate other
resource uses." Further, the multiple-use decision process "will also
determine when other resources and uses (for example grazing, recreation,
community development) may be temporarily or permanently reduced to
allow for coal leasing and production." From this policy statement one
can conclude that "unsuitability" is a criterion that is provisional in the
extreme-now you see it, now you don't. In the case of the Federal Coal
Program the decision process was not exclusively adversarial (and traditional); public participation as well as lawsuits and advisement by
Congress39 has shaped these laws. However, the confusion in logical
types is very similar to the confusion in use and ownership mentioned
above.
In the unsuitability criteria themselves there is an issue at conflict.
Public outcry over the specific list of twenty criteria has resulted in a
very rare reissue of a draft environmental impact statement'"and a revision
of the regulations regarding coal leasing. 4 ' For example, at public hearings
held in Albuquerque, specific exception was taken to criteria (with regard
to the San Juan Basin in the Four Comers area) dealing with ights-ofway, wildlife, and designated natural areas and landmarks.42 The Federal
Coal Program's unsuitability criteria were only historic and contemporary
rights-of-way. The entire Chaco Canyon region is criss-crossed with ancient
highways of the Aztec-Mayan era that connect one site of Chaco culture
to another.43 These highways are often not visible (except to overhead
scrutiny, particularly from Landsat) and did not get the protection of the
unsuitability criteria. The wildlife criteria (several of the twenty listed)
39. Id.
40. SAN JUAN RIVER REGIONAL COAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, U.S. DEPr. INTERIOR.,
BUR. OF LAND MANAGEMENT (1983) (2nd draft).
41. REviEw, supra note 38.
42. Testimony at Hearings held in Albuquerque by the Bureau of Land Management, 1984.
43. Barsook, Assessing the Potential Application of Conflict Management Strategies to Archeological Resource Management, An ExploratoryStudy, Master's Thesis (1983).
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are concerned only with living wildlife. The whole San Juan Basin is the
site of world-class geologic structures that contain the only fossil record
of small mammals co-existing with dinosaur-like reptiles. These formations were not protected by the unsuitability criteria. Third, the outlying
Chacoan settlements themselves, since they are older than a historical
time context and since they are not officially designated "building," were
not covered by the unsuitability criteria.
These concerns and many others raised by the Federal Coal Management Program have been addressed and rectified in the Review of the
Unsuitability Criteria. While not strictly conflict resolution in the sense
of litigation, nor alternative dispute resolution (though regional coal teams
"negotiated" much of the plan) in the sense of mediated policymaking,
the environmental impact statement process used in promulgating the
federal policy is a familiar type that falls between old and new. And it
fails, consistently. Even with public input the typical environmental impact
statement is sadly inappropriate in its logical type-it rarely is as complex,
interconnected, logarithmic or irreversible as natural processes are; it is
rarely cognizant of the time horizon of the resource; and it all too often
assumes a well put out map is the territory. The precedent-setting draft
-revision may put new life into the EIS process, however. And it needs
mentioning here that an environmental impact statement is as good as
law as well as being one of the strongest area-defining decisionmakers
in the arsenal of public and private sectors (utilities are quasi-public
entities): it is fitting to consider the EIS process in a context of dispute
resolution methodologies.
Denver Water Roundtable'
In 1981 the Denver Water Board, in response to controversy over a
proposed dam project that would supply the metropolitan Denver area,
began a policy dialogue with major stakeholders that would craft a longterm solution to the Denver-Foothills-Front Range water supply. In the
process of dialogue the parties reached a preliminary settlement agreement
to include five suburban counties in seeking cooperative financing for the
negotiated water supply project. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was
at the same time preparing a systemwide EIS scoping process. As a result
of the Roundtable's inclusion of the surburban counties (not initially
parties to the discussions) in the dialogue, the Corps has included them
in the systemwide study. In this case the policy dialogue appears to have
been cast in logical mould large enough to accommodate the significant
44. Carpenter & Kennedy, The Denver Metropolitan Water Roundtable: A Case Study in Reaching
Agreements. 28 NAT. Res. J. 21 (1988).
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increase in stakeholding parties without breaking. The logical type of
both settlement and conflict are suited to each other and the fit is appropriate and heartening.
Navajo Nation
Two water disputes involving the Navajo tribe present a perspective
on the limits of negotiation (and litigation), limits which directly address
the concepts of use and ownership as non-overlapping logical classifications. The Navajo are entitled, through the doctrine established in
Winters v. U.S., to as much water as was intended at the time their
reservation was established so as to insure the reservation would survive.4 5
Many Indian tribes also subject to the Winters Doctrine have put off
quantifying the water to which they are entitled (particularly in scarcewater states) in order not to put a cap on that amount. Usually, once
decided, it is impossible to reopen a closed legal issue. This is so for
obvious reasons of fairness. But an allocation of a certain number of
acre-feet for irrigation purposes in the 1920s may not be responsive to a
requirement for water-dependent power generation in the '80s, or for a
sufficiency of flow to guarantee water quality and wildlife habitat. In the
case of the Navajo Nation's agreement to limit its claims to upper basin
water in the Colorado River in return for benefits with regard to construction and operation of a major coal-fired power plant, an amending
resolution was passed by the tribe that specifically provided the agreement
in no way constituted a waiver of rights to water established by the Winters
Doctrine. The use of some of the resource would not constitute a definition
of the ownership of that resource. And the second issue, involving water
diverted by the State of New Mexico from the Colorado watershed to the
Rio Grande watershed, was resolved by legislation that does not abridge
future Winters rights claims by the Navajo to additional Colorado water.
The Navajo have distinguished, unequivocally, between the two classifications: use and ownership. This is not always possible, though perhaps
through alternative dispute resolution it should be: the Tohono O'odam
tribe has had to waive its future claims to water in the Tucson area (as
provided for in the Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act, the
agreement that resolved the conflicts over groundwater around the Tucson
area) 46
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
Many of the environmental conflicts involving Native Americans are
disputes over sovereignty, not the use of the environmental resource in
45. Folk-Williams, supra note 32, at 66. The Winters Doctrine was established by 207 U.S. 564

(1908).
46. Folk-Williams, supra note 32, at 79.
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question. Perhaps it does not always seem to be the case; examining
environmental disputes in Alaska can clarify the often hidden agendas in
some of the conflicts listed above.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA), 7 and its
motivation are similar to the General Allotment Act of 1887," the Osage
Tribal Roll Statute of 1906,' 9 the Menominee Termination Act (1954),10
and the 1963 decision in Arizona v. Californiathat elaborates practicably
irrigable acreage. 5 ' In each of these statutes and court decisions the dominant culture has made an attempt to consume the Native American culture. (In this sense here is an example of the duality of self and other: if
you cannot assimilate and be the Other, then you can hate the Other.)
Ambivalence toward Native Americans profoundly marks American society. The General Allotment Act, known as the Dawes Act, was an effort
to remove Indian tribes from reservations by offering individual land
ownership to tribal members. It was attempt to nullify the culture of
participation, of tribal ownership, in favor of private ownership and alienation from "nature." The Osage Tribal Roll Statute of 1906 introduced
the notion of part-Indian to the Osage nation and eventually, through
enrollment, to other tribes across the country. At one point entire tribes
disappeared because they weren't enough parts Indian. The Menominee
Termination Act nullified an entire tribe by proposing that the Menominee
be corporate shareholders in the tribally-owned resource, a sawmill. The
Menominee were to be businessmen. In Arizona v. Californiathe decision
by the Supreme Court in 1963 quantified the Indian fight to sovereignty
over tribal waters in terms of how much water was needed to irrigate
those tribal lands. The Indians were to be farmers. The Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act set out purchase land from Alaska Natives extinguishing thereby title (and the right to hunt and to fish) to 90 percent of
the land and awarding title to the remaining 10 percent to Native-owned
corporations specifically set up by the legislation. Title was awarded to
corporations, not to the tribal governments which had administered the
native subsistence culture for millennia. The Alaskan Natives are to be
shareholders. ANCSA has had the effect (potentially) of nullifying an
entire culture; certainly the subsistence way of life has been jeopardized
by the imposition of corporate ownership and by the loss of access and
usufruct on noncorporate lands.52 The subsistence way of life, indeed the
entire fabric of Alaskan and Inuit/Athapaskan/Yupiat cultures may be rent
47. 43 U.S.C. § 1601-1628 (1982). See also Berger, Conflict in Alaska, 28 NAT. RES. J. 37
(1988).
48. 25 U.S.C. §331-358 (1982).

49. Ch. 3504, 34 Stat. 363, ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539 (1906).
50. Ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (repealed 1973).
51. INDIAN WATER, supra note 33, at 6.
52. T. BtGER, Village Journey, 48-72 (1985).
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once and for all if village corporations, currently in financial distress, are
forced to sell shares to non-natives.
The conflict in Alaska has been seething for years. ANCSA has proven
to add layers of dispute to the problem, making a resolution all the more
intractable through the addition of racism to a complex situation in a
complex environment. How might the conflict be resolved? In Berger's
article, a methodology is presented that offers real hope to practitioners
eager to avoid the mis-steps of determinism. By invoking a process of
fact-finding that is inclusive (hundreds of hours of interviews with absolutely anyone who wished to talk), dynamic (the time framework stretched
to the mists of the past and far into the veiled future), technically appropriate (all "facts" in the issue are present, and so is a lot of information
that exceeds the "factual") and by inventing a neutral process to disseminate this information (Berger himself is not a government representative or even a stakeholder in the process), and by involving all the
potential stakeholders (his findings are widely published and reading the
material makes one a party to the issues), the conflict over ANCSA may
well be a hallmark in the history of alternative dispute resolution. Certainly the possibility for educating ourselves is there.
AVOIDING THE TRAP
There are many encouraging signs that alternatives to the traditional
means of resolving disputes are able to evolve longer lasting settlements,
more just settlements, and settlements that address the conflict issues
directly. This last section examines a probable future course of EDR,
looking in particular at the process of negotiation-a technique that may
be the undoing of environmental dispute resolution.
The trap lying upon the path of the future is that of mechanism. The
profession searches for a mechanism that will resolve conflicts. Such a
mechanism is going to be another iteration of other decisionmakers traditionally used to resolve conflict. Examples from the preceding discussion are legislation (Federal Coal Management Plan), litigation (Arizona
v. California), NEPA and the environmental impact statement (coal leasing unsuitability criteria), other decisionmakers from the legal arena (stipulations, contracts, case law), economic expedience (benefit/cost ratios),
and political utility (Montana's Compact Commission and the possibility
of water marketing). 3 The two exceptions to this list stand out and
underscore the rule: both the Denver Metropolitan Water Roundtable and
the findings published by Berger on ANCSA are processes, not mecha53. INDIAN WATER,
THE ENERGY MARKET

supra note 33, at 24. See also J. FOLK-WILLIAMS
60-69 (1983).

& J. CANNON, WATER FOR
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nisms. Both are also decisionmakers. It isn't the decisionmaker that needs
to be left behind in the future years of dispute resolution, it is the notion
of decisionmaker as tool, mechanism, template, yardstick, the facts,
precedent, and tangible.
Mechanism is also present in the problem-solving methodology that is
the typical litigation experience. A brief reminiscence brings the danger
of mechanistic outlook to mind. The B. Everett Jordan Dam at Pittsboro,
North Carolina, was proposed in order to reduce the danger of spring
flooding along the Haw River. After much pork barrel and resistance, the
money was appropriated and construction scheduled. The local conservation group intervened, stating that the proposed water level would not
prevent eutrophication of upper reaches, that prime river habitat would
be lost in favor of a possible mitigation of 100 year flooding, that the
cost far exceeded the benefits, that proposed recreation was unrealistic
due to the shallowness of the impounded lake, and that the water supply
for Chapel Hill would be threatened by contamination from backed up
swamps. The local conservation group lost on appeal. The decision54 by
Chief Judge Gordon was to build the dam as designed. He stipulated that
the floodgates, however, were to remain open until such time as the Haw
River actually flooded. So in the middle of the Piedmont, a very large
dam structure that backs up a very small lake awaits massive recreation
opportunities and 100 year flooding. The area was clear-cut (although
secondary environmental degradation from the effects of tourism and
homebuilding at water's edge had not yet occurred in 1983). This was a
compromise that served neither the resource nor the perceived need for
flood control, nor was it an economic boost to the area, nor did it serve
the water supply. The mechanism was unsuited to the level of the logical
types at issue. Most mechanisms are unsuited to environment. Environment is process, not mechanism. Environmental Dispute Resolution is
eminently suited to be process. It is when it is treated as a mechanism
that it misbehaves.
The Negotiation Process
EDR is able to operate at a level that encompasses process and form
as well as product and function. It should include those iterative operations
that lead back upon themselves in a candid reflection of the operations
of the real world. EDR can relate to the irreversibility of the natural world
by insuring time consistencies during the period of conflict resolution
fact-finding and at the settlement, by offering resolutions that are themselves consistent with the time horizon of the environment at issue. EDR
can avoid much of the determinism inherent in society-whether an infa54, Conserv. Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 435 F Supp. 775, M.D.N.C. (1977).
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tuation with legal process or, more insidiously, the rampant love affair
with therapeutic determinism, This latter problem is seen when mediators
maintain that the morality of the resolution is not part of the problemyou're ok if I'm ok-and it is apparent in much mediation today. Is
negotiation the technique of choice for EDR?
Folk-Williams, in his article on Indian water rights, suggests that practitioners feel that enough water and enough time bode well for negotiation,55
but litigation may be the path of choice when it comes to scarce resources.
This places negotiation unhesitatingly into the pie-cutting business--distributive solutions and not integrative ones are to be expected from the
process of negotiation. In the case of the Ak-Chin water dispute there is
an insufficiency of water-water is up to 300 percent over-appropriated
in Arizona. The "pie pieces" in that dispute will be very thin indeed,
sometimes not appearing on the plate except in years of plenty. In contrast,
the Montana Compact Commission's negotiations with the Assiniboine
and Sioux tribes of the Ft. Peck Reservation are designed to allocate an
abundance of water, water that is presently unused but that will most
likely be sold out-of-state (either by the tribes or by the state) in the
future. In the Ak-Chin and Tohono O'odam cases, if negotiation is used
for future disputes, it may be successful; certainly the trend with the
Montana Commission is one of fitfully, but successfully concluded negotiations. These negotiations are distributive solutions being applied to
problems that are not ones of quantity.
Resolution of conflict in Alaska calls for a methodology that can discriminate between use and ownership. Subsistence, the primary issue at
conflict in Alaska, is the logical type par excellence-subsuming, as it
does, both use and ownership. Can negotiation, even integrative negotiation with mediators involved, see clearly that both use and ownership
are engaged in the concept of subsistence? According to Berger, subsistence has yet to be dealt with directly in the legislation and court suits
pending on ANCSA. Should one's way of life be negotiated?56 In the
two water conflicts on Navajo land the future rights to Winters Doctrine
water were specifically kept off the negotiation table. Negotiation, as
presently constituted, even when modified by a therapeutic determinism,
cannot resolve conflicts of values. Much confusion is generated by the
question of whether values can be negotiated. It isn't values that are ever
on the table for distributive justice-it is self-interest.57 No one willingly
surrenders his values; he may be informed by someone else's values, but
55. Folk-Williams, supra note 32.

56.

WATTS, THE WISDOM OF INSECURITY

120-21 (1951).

57. See L. TRIBE, WHEN VALUES CONFLICT for a closed system of transcendence and immanence,
placed in a somewhat Biblical context. Also Swentzell, An Understated Sacredness, MASS, UNM
ScH. ARCH. & PLAN. 24 (Fall 1985).
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values themselves are a red herring. No one surrenders his self-interest
(pace altruists and sociobiologists alike) willingly. A methodology that
goes beyond the limits of negotiation can permit each party to inform
itself of the other's self-interest and may even provide a framework of
respect for that self-interest. Such a methodology would balk at a valuedefinition that described our whole universe in terms of its immanence
or transcendence: surely valuation can be both immanent and transcendent. Such a methodology would reject the notion that one could only act
individually or universally or somewhere between, but not individually
and universally. The flexibility of problem definition that characterizes
the Denver Water Roundtable" demonstrates a wide arena for human
involvement within the context of Colorado's water problems.
Much of the refinement of negotiation is framed by those interested in
game theory. 59 In maximizing one's self-interest, how is it possible to
consider the idea that one might choose to act in the public good, or in
the community's interest? While game theory is not the natural world
described at this article's beginning, the moral dilemma of acting for the
Good is, in fact, addressed in Axelrod's work on Tit For Tat, a cooperative
negotiation game strategy. Modeling the real world, Axelrod demonstrates
that a player who in an opening move acts generously and on a responding
move acts cooperatively (even punishing bad moves but forgiving the
opponent), never initiating an attack, will outscore any other strategy,
given time and averaging. He further demonstrates that such a moral
stance encourages both sides to act cooperatively, and even proselytize
in neighboring "communities." It is possible, it seems, to choose to act
in the community's interest, it is even rewarding, provided that one
doesn't lose sight of one's own interest.
CONCLUSION
Environmental dispute resolution has made important contributions to
traditional efforts at settling environmental conflict. EDR has enhanced
and augmented data-gathering, increased participation of stakeholders,
provided more sophisticated delineation of the problem and a much broader
framework of considerations. For the next fifteen years, the field of environmental dispute resolution needs to move beyond these accomplish58. Carpenter & Kennedy, supra note 44.
59. See RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982) for a particularly linear analysis
of negotiation, based on game theory. See R. FISHER & W. URY, GETIING TO YES (1981) for a nonlinear strategy of negotiation that eschews the choice between cooperative and competitive modalities.
Finally, R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) applies closed system modeling to

the open non-linear "real world." The notion of therapeutic determinism and its presence in current
training programs in dispute resolution, is this author's adaptation of the impeccable scholarship in
R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER, & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART (1985).
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ments and truly resolve conflict-by moving beyond the distributive and
mechanistic process of negotiation and moving into processes that are
compatible with the symbolic and complex nature of the environment
itself. Settlements consistent with both past and future time horizons need
to be crafted in a way that is appropriate to the level of logical type that
the environment presents-and the human population will be a part of
the environment, not standing apart from it. Processes that encourage
recognition of motivating self-interest and a motivation to act for the
community's good are called for in the future. In the next fifteen years
environmental dispute resolution will be challenged to deal with the most
complex, intractable, and global environmental problems. The future of
EDR is in the future, not in the past.

